Abstract. The paper studies the relative merits of direct and representative legislation in a setting where voters are uncertain both with respect to the likely consequences of different policies and with respect to the political preferences of their fellow citizens. Under representative legislation, the latter translates into uncertainty on the elected official's future policy intentions which involves a loss of control. The resulting discretionary power, however, also leads officials to endogenously acquire competence on the issues they oversee and specialize in policy formation. Policies determined in representative democracies are therefore better tailored to relevant contingencies but less close to the preferences of a majority than those determined in popular ballots. It is shown that the extent of the resulting trade-off depends on the set of alternatives among which the policy is to be chosen. Two extensions, referenda and the possibility of re-election, are briefly considered.
Introduction
Most democratic countries allow in their constitution for the provision of direct legislation. Switzerland, the most well-known exponent of direct democracy, has held almost five hundred popular ballots at the federal level since direct legislation has been embodied in the modern Swiss constitution of 1848.
1 Legislation by direct vote rather than by elected representatives has also become an essential part of the political system in the some U.S. states: at the beginning of the century, a number of states with California (1911) as the prominent state have adopted law-making through ballot initiatives and statewide referenda.
2 More recently, the enlargement and further integration of the EU has triggered a series of important referenda in Europe and there are currently campaigns in several European countries under way that aim to promote direct democratic institutions. * I am grateful to Christoph Lülfesmann, Patrick Schmitz and Urs Schweizer for helpful comments and discussions, as well as an anonymous referee who provided valuable comments on an earlier draft. The author also wishes to thank the Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley for its hospitality and the German Academic Exchange Service 'Hochschulsonderprogramm III' for its financial support. All errors are my own.
This paper studies the determinants and the consequences of direct and representative legislation from a positive point of view. To this end, I develop a theoretical framework designed to capture the stylized features of either legislative regime and the environment in which political choices take place. I consider a jurisdiction that has to decide on some specific policy issue. The citizens can either resolve the issue through a direct ballot or, alternatively, elect one citizen as their representative who subsequently determines the policy for the jurisdiction. A central element of the model is that these choices take place in an inherently uncertain environment. Specifically, citizens are incompletely informed both on the future political preferences of their fellow citizens and on the likely consequences of the policies that can be enacted. That is, although their preferences over potential candidates for office and over political outcomes are well defined, they are uncertain as to their (potential) representative's future policy intentions and as to how policies map into outcomes. A natural trade-off between representative and direct democracy therefore emerges: if the policy decision is delegated to an elected official, the representative has an incentive to become knowledgeable on the issue he oversees, provided that he has discretionary power. Voters in a direct ballot, in contrast, will rationally remain ignorant because their vote is unlikely to be decisive. Hence, the main advantage of a representative government is that the official (endogenously) specializes in policy formation. Political outcomes will be thus more sensitive to contingencies that are relevant for the determination of policy. Yet, the delegation of political decisions also comes at a cost because elected officials necessarily enjoy some discretion in their political acts: since citizens are imperfectly informed on the policy intentions of candidates at the time of election, the representative's future political choices need not reflect the popular will.
To investigate this trade-off in more detail, I consider two examples which differ in the set of alternatives among which the policy is chosen. In a first scenario, this set is sufficiently rich so that an official's incentives to acquire competence (gather information) are independent of his political views. In this case, the constitutional choice between the two regimes is taken unanimously: representative democracy is preferred by all citizens if and only if the common gains from informed political decision making exceed the loss of control associated with delegation. The second scenario involves a limited set of alternatives that so that the gains from information are not equal across the political spectrum. In such a situation, if a majority of the population strongly favors a specific course of action, it strictly prefers to resolve the issue in a popular ballot, irrespective of how confident voters can be that an elected official represents the political center. Conversely, representative legislation is preferred for issues on which a majority has no strong opinion in favor of a
